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1. INTRODUCTION
Governments use financial incentives to induce private firms to
undertake socially desirable investments which are not privately feasible.
Examples of such investments are projects which create jobs in thin labor
markets as well as projects which preserve jobs by assisting distressed
corporations such as Massey Ferguson or Chrysler. Financial incentives
include cash grants, guarantees, concessionary loans, direct investment, and
tax preferences such as tax holidays, tax credits, or special depreciation
allowances.
Most financial incentives, including tax preferences, commit the
government to future outlays. The outlays are often not specified in
advance and may depend on a variety of unknowns. As a result, such
incentives frequently bypass the budget process which typically is designed
to control current cash outlays. Failure to control financial incentives
within the budget is a serious problem for two reasons. First, budgetary
controls impose a discipline which motivates careful evaluation of
individual projects and programs. Programs not subject to budgetary
oversight are likely not to be as carefully evaluated. Second, the budget
limits total expenditures to a level consistent with tax and borrowing
policy. When off-budget items like loan guarantees cause large unplanned
expenditures, the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies may be seriously
impaired.
In Canada, budgetary control has already been extended to tax-based
incentives through the Federal Tax Expenditure Budget. Further, loans and
equity investments are treated as recoverable cash outlays and hence also
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are controlled to an extent. However, guarantees are not reflected in the
budget unless and until they result in cash outlays. These differences in
treatment of alternative types of outlays distort the budgetary process,
since in order to have effective control and planning at all levels of
government consistent cost measures must be employed. A similar problem
exists in the United States and many other industrialized countries. As
Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office notes:
"increases in the aggregate level of resources being allocated by the
federal government through loans and guarantees...have occurred without
any explicit decision by the Congress that they should occur."Y
In the past the difficulty of incorporating guarantees and other
contingent future subsidies in the budget has been in determining a
comparable measure of their cost. However, recent advances in financial
economics now provide the basis for computing cash grant-equivalents of
highly complex contracts including most guarantees. The cash
grant-equivalent is the cash amount that the recipient would willingly
accept in place of the contingent, future subsidy. We will argue it is the
relevant measure of a subsidy for budgetary accounting purposes.2
This paper first describes current methods of accounting for guarantees
and other financial interventions within the Canadian federal budget. It
then discusses the problems of misapplication and misallocation that may be
fostered under the current system. The paper goes on to recommend changes
1 Hearings before the Task Force on the Budget, House of Representatives,
Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, November 13, 1979.
2 The term-grant equivalent or cash grant equivalent is used in the
development literature to connote the proportion of foreign aid that
represents a true transfer.
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that would put guarantees and other indirect subsidies on a comparable
footing with direct federal support. Specifically, we recommend that cash
grant equivalents of indirect subsidies be computed and that ceilings on
such subsidies be incorporated into the budgetary targets. Integrating
financial subsidies into the budget in this way, we argue, both is feasible
and would provide benefits in the form of more consistent resource
allocation, and more accurate planning than the current system affords.
2. ACCOUNTING FOR FINANCIAL INCENTIVES: THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The government of Canada operates on a cash appropriations budget.
However, it employs a five-year Policy and Expenditure Management System
which includes the current fiscal year, the upcoming fiscal year for which
the main estimates are prepared, and three planning years. The expenditure
plan is broken down into ten "resource envelopes" which reflect the broad
functions of government and cut across departmental and agency lines. The
principal resource envelopes are Economic Development, Energy, Social
Affairs, and Defence.3
Each envelope is divided into an "A-base" of ongoing projects and a
Policy Reserve of "B-base" to fund new initiatives. When a new project or
program is proposed it is first scrutinized by the envelope policy
committee. If approved, its initial funding is charged against the
envelope's Policy Reserve. Funding in subsequent years is incorporated into
the A-base.
3 See Canada Treasury Board [1980] or Canada Department of Finance [1981]
for descriptions of the Policy and Expenditure Management System.
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Envelope ceilings are set every year and the Policy Reserve or B-base is
defined as the difference between the A-base budget and the ceiling. In
principle, once the ceiling is set, the Policy Reserve can only be expanded
by shrinking the A-base, that is by cutting back on some existing program.
Thus the scale of new programs is limited to the Policy Reserve plus
whatever can be saved out of the A-base. The envelope ceiling thus
effectively limits the total size of new initiatives within each envelope.
However, actual decisions on which projects are funded and which are
deferred are made by ministers acting as a group through the envelope
committee.
The primary purpose of the envelope system is to force policymakers to
consider the opportunity cost of choices they make within the constraints
imposed by overall fiscal policy as reflected in the envelope ceilings. The
envelopes are a pragmatic mechanism which lead decisionmakers to make the
types of tradeoffs idealized in social cost-benefit analysis. Inevitably,
the tradeoffs are affected by the way in which various types of
interventions are reflected in the budget and hence charged against the
envelopes.
In general, the government may subsidize an activity in a variety of
ways: for example it may provide a cash grant, a tax reduction or an
indirect financial subsidy such as a concessionary loan, a guarantee or
equity capital.4 However, the envelope budget reflects only the direct
cash outlay or tax expenditure associated with any intervention. Table 1
summarizes how a
4 Equity capital on which the government expects to earn less than a fair
market rate of return contains an implicit subsidy.
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variety of interventions with the same grant-equivalent would be charged
against an envelope under the current system. The calculations are purely
illustrative and designed to show how the current budgetary system works:
calculations for any actual intervention would be more complicated might and
yield different results.
Table 1 shows that interventions with the same real impact are not
treated consistently within the budget. For example, taxable cash grants
are accounted for on a gross of tax basis: the envelope does not benefit
from taxes recouped on a cash grant to a tax-paying corporation. This is a
relatively minor budgetary distortion.
An apparently larger distortion arises in the treatment of loans. When
a loan is made, the full face amount of the loan is deducted from the
envelope: the envelope recoups the face amount of the loan if it is
repaid. Nevertheless, unless the probability of default on a loan is close
to 100l , the initial charge to the envelope will be substantially higher
than the real impact or subsidy transmitted by the intervention. Thus,
within the envelope, loans are a relatively inefficient use of budgetary
resources. In fact, they are very seldom used. Subsidized lending by the
government is for the most part carried out by organizations such as the
Export Development Corporation (EDP) and the Federal Business Development
Bank (FBDB) which have been set up as lending institutions. These bank like
agencies are separately capitalized and their revenues and costs netted out
in the appropriations budget. Since loans require servicing and monitoring,
the restriction of lending activities to specialized institutions within the
government seems reasonable. The lending authority of these institutions is
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determined by statute and is not directly affected by the envelope
ceilings. For this reason, the budgeting for loans within the envelopes,
although highly distortive in theory, probably causes few problems in
practice.
Finally, guarantees are not charged against an envelope in the year they
are granted. Instead, the envelope is held liable if a payment is required
in subsequent years. For example, in 1981, the economic envelope committee
approved a ten-year guarantee of newly issued Massey-Ferguson preferred
stock. The guarantee did not affect the envelope in 1981. However, if
Massey-Ferguson defaults on its preferred stock, in theory up to $130
million (the face amount of the guarantee) would be charged against the
economic envelope's Policy Reserve in the year of default.
The policy of charging for guarantees on the basis of cash payments
required may be appropriate for programs which guarantee large numbers of
small transactions. With a large number of small and independent risks, the
percentage of defaults in any given year is predictable and can be accounted
for as a budgeted expense within a standard accounting framework. Thus, if
student loan guarantees have a default rate of five percent,then five
percent of the increase in loans outstanding can be appropriated each year
to pay for the student loan guarantee program. Although at the eginning of
the year it is not known which loans will default, the large number of such
loans usually ensures that actual outflows correspond closely to budgeted
outflows.
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The "pay as you go" policy implicitly separates the decision to grant
the guarantee from the consequences of the decision. With an ongoing
program this is usally not a serious problem, because deviations of actual
from expected losses will be small in any given accounting period. However,
the "pay as you go" system is not appropriate for large, special-purpose
guarantees such as Massey-Ferguson. First, with a large, unique risk it is
impossible to budget for "average" default experience and expect actual
payments to be close to the budgeted amounts in any given year. Second, in
a case of a default, the incremental expenditure is likely to be large
relative to any individual budget. This creates problems for the
enforcement of budgetary ceilings after the default occurs. As an
illustration of these problems, the Economic Envelope Policy Reserve for new
projects amounts to approximately $300 to $350 million per year. Under the
current system, a Massey-Ferguson default would result in a charge of $130
million against the Policy Reserve. A number of responses to such a large
loss are possible. First, the Massey default might displace $130 million of
new economic initiatives, or might force an equivalent shrinking of existing
programs (the A-base). In either case the envelope would function as
designed. On the other hand, to mitigate the impact of the default, the
envelope ceiling might be relaxed. A relaxation of the ceiling is a
reasonable response to a large disruptive shock, and thus would be justified
at the time default occurred.
Thus the "pay as you go" budgetary treatment of large guarantees results
in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. If losses are
extracted from the envelope, the envelope's planning function is severely
distorted since expenditure limits will be subject to large random shocks.
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On the other hand, if it is generally understood that large guarantee losses
will not be charged to the envelope, guarantees become a free good and
escape budgetary discipline altogether.
We have shown that financial interventions, particularly guarantees, are
not controlled or consistently accounted for within the current budgetary
system. But why are control and consistent accounting for financial
incentives desirable? In Section 3 below, we argue that all financial
incentives transmit quantifiable subsidies to the recipient firms: these
subsidize channels, if not controlled, will be misused. To prevent
misallocations, a system for evaluating indirect subsidies within a broader
public resource allocation framework is necessary: this topic is addressed
in Section 4.
3. THE CONTROL OF INDIRECT SUBSIDIES
Indirect financial subsidies arise when a private individual or firm
gets capital at less than the fair market cost. For example, the government
may lend money to a corporation at a zero or below-market rate, or it may
invest in equity (purchase shares) without requiring a fair rate of return.
As an alternative, it may guarantee the debt or equity of the same
corporation; with the government's credit behind it, the company will be
able to raise capital on more advantageous terms than would have been
possible without the guarantee.
Whenever the government gives a firm access to capital on favorable
terms, it transmits a subsidy to that firm. In the case of a direct loan
-9-
or equity, the subsidy is proportional to the difference between the rate of
return required by the government and the fair rate of return on an
equivalent investment in the capital market. Thus, if the government
expects no return from a Crown corporation investment, the subsidy is equal
to the total investment (the capital of the Crown corporation). If the
government expects or requires capital to be returned after a number of
years, the subsidy is proportional to the amount that the funds would be
expected to earn if invested commercially in the intervening years. Only if
the government lends or invests money expecting to earn the market rate or
return is no subsidy transmitted by the transaction.
Guarantees are more complicated than direct loans or equity investments
because initially no money changes hands. A guarantee commits the
government to a payment if default occurs in the future. If the probability
of default is zero, the guarantee is negligible to the government, and
worthless to the recipient. However, if the probability of default is
positive, the subsidy is proportional to the amount guaranteed and to the
probability that default will make payment necessary. Evaluation of the
subsidy component of a guarantee cannot be separated from the assessment of
outcomes and probabilistics affecting the future of the recipient firm.
The fact that guarantees are affected by uncertain future events has led
to a widespread belief that the subsidy implicit in a guarantee is not
quantifiable. This is far from being the case. Rough magnitudes of the
subsidy can be estimated subjectively. For example, a guarantee extended to
a new, thinly capitalized venture such as the Bricklin Corporation is
clearly worth more to the recipient than a guarantee for the same face
-10-
amount given to an established, strongly capitalized enterprise such as
General Motors. The probability of default in the first case might be 5;
in the second the probability of default might be very small, say 1%.
Assuming that the same amount was guaranteed in each case, the subsidy
transmitted by the first obligation would be approximately fifty times the
subsidy transmitted by the second. Rough estimates of relative magnitudes
can be greatly refined by application of modern contingent claims analysis
(CCA). Contingent claims analysis is based on the same principle as applies
to the hypothetical Bricklin-GM comparison: the higher the probability of a
payment on a guarantee, the higher the implicit subsidy. CCA extends this
onsight to take account of the evolution of the enterprise and of the
associated guarantee over time.
Financial interventions which represent potential subsidies are subject
to misuse. The private sector may misuse financial subsidies by negotiating
contracts which maximize the private value of the subsidy, regardless of
public welfare. For example, if loan guarantees are used to encourage job
creation, the private sector will seek to solicit guarantees for
undercapitalized, risky ventures. These ventures are less likely to provide
permanent employment benefits than stable, heavily capitalized enterprises,
but will obtain more value from the guarantee. Misuse of indirect subsidies
by the private sector can be redressed through increased awareness by public
sector negotiatiors of how specific contracts induce adverse selection and
poor management of projects. However, the potential for private misuse does
not in itself make a budgetary control necessary.
-11 -
Budgetary control is necessary because if cash and tax expenditures are
strictly controlled and financial subsidies are not, then public agencies
may use financial contacts to manage budgetary expenditures. Within the
current government accounting system, financial contracts can be used to
inflate or deflate reported budgetary expenditures. To accelerate
expenditure (e.g. for the purpose of protecting a budget allocation), the
agency can make loans or equity investments; as long as the capital is
eventually repaid to the agency, these transactions have the effect of
transferring an unused allocation from the present into the future. To
defer expenditures, an agency can issue guarantees. Guarantees have no
impact on current expenditures but do affect outstanding liabilities. They
are a way for an agency to transfer budget resources from the future into
the present. Using guarantees, an agency can increase the subsidies it
gives today, without increasing its current budget allocation.
In order to exercise budgetary control over all financial subsidies, a
unit of account must be identified. Requirements of the accounting unit are
twofold: first it should measure only the subsidy component of any
contract. It is important to measure the subsidy alone because the size of
a financial transaction (e.g. the face amount of a loan or guarantee) may
greatly overstate the actual magnitude of resources deployed. This in turn
results in improper comparisons: for example, in the hypothetical
Bricklin-GM comparison above, identical guarantees given to two different
firms would lead to very different probable outlays in the future. To be
effective, the budgetary unit of account must capture these differences.
-12-
A second requirement of the accounting unit is that it should permit
comparisons across various types of subsidies: that is it should be
possible to compare a loan or guarantee with a cash grant or a tax
reduction. Comparability promotes consistency in the allocation of
resources, and gives the public sector maximum flexibility in the design of
appropriate interventions.
The cash grant-equivalent of an indirect financial subsidy is defined as
the amount of cash which the recipient would willingly receive today in lieu
of the financial contract. Within a highly developed capital market like
Canada's, the grant-equivalent amount is equal to the capitalized value of
the financial contract viewed as a claim by the private sector on the
government. The identification of a grant-equivalent with the private value
of a claim makes it possible to estimate grant-equivalents using modern
financial valuation methods.
A cash grant-equivalent measures only the subsidy component of a
transaction (the grant-equivalent of a non-subsidized transaction is zero)
and because it is expressed as a present value, it can readily be compared
with the present value of other subsidies such as cash grants and tax
reductions.5 Furthermore, use of the cash grant equivalent is fully
consistent with optimal resource allocation and the methods of social
cost-benefit analysis. In fact we show in the following section that, under
5 Present values are useful for economic cost-benefit analysis but
budgetary systems usually focus on the control of annual expenditures.
Thus, to be useful in budgetary analysis, cash rant-equivalents may
need to be converted into annualized costs which may be viewed as interest
costs or insurance premiums.
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weak restrictions on the public sectors activities, the calculation of
grant-equivalents is essential to the design of appropriate public
interventions in private sector decisions. The risk is not utilizing the
grant-equivalent is that the private sector will be over-compensated for
undertaking socially desirable actions.
4. ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES FROM A PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE
The decision to grant subsidies hinges on the answers to two related
questions: does the project deserve support and does it require support?
Social cost-benefit analysis determines whether it deserves support.
Private investment analysis determines whether it requires support. When a
project both deserves and requires support, the role of budgetary analysis
is to ensure that the magnitude and type of the incentive is appropriate.
These three related analyses are illustrated in Figure 1, with the heavy
line illustrating the "critical path" for a project deserving and requiring
public support. Each stage is discussed below.
Social Cost-Benefit Analysis
In evaluations of public projects, or of public support for private
projects, the appropriate social perspective takes account of the project's
impact on all sectors of society. In performing this analysis the costs and
benefits of the project are measured in terms of real resource inflows and
outflows, each priced at the relevant marginal social cost. Included in the
benefits of the project are any public goods which it generates as well as
the taxes it pays. However, public support is justified only if the private
sector will not undertake the project without assistance. Thus a private
evaluation must be undertaken.
-14-
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Figure 1
Framework for Evaluating Financial Incentives
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Private Valuation
The private valuation of a project takes into account only those costs
and benefits which are borne by or are appropriated by the private
enterprise involved. Thus, it is quite possible for a project to be
socially beneficial and yet not be privately profitable, e.g., if it creates
new permanent jobs. If a socially worthwhile project also passes the
private-market test, i.e., has positive value, no public intervention should
be necessary. On the other hand, if the project fails the private-market
test, i.e., has negative value, public intervention is necessary to get the
project funded. To reverse the private sector's decision, the project must
get a subsidy greater than or equal to the private value shortfall. The
private sector then considers the "base" project plus the subsidy as a new
project which, by design passes the private value test.
In a well-functioning capital market the subsidy can be constructed in
many different ways. It may be an immediate cash grant, a stream of
deferred cash payments or future tax reductions, a concessionary loan, a
guarantee, or a direct or equity investment. Whatever form the subsidy
takes, the private capital markets will assign a value to the contract. The
valuation will take account of the time pattern and risk characteristics of
the cash flows, including any contingent claims built into the contract.
This present value is the amount a private sector agent would willingly
exchange for the subsidy. This is the amount we have defined as the subsidy
cash grant-equivalent.
Once the present value is assessed, the subsidy can be "capitalized,"
that is, its cash flows can be sold, pledged as collateral, used as the
-16-
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basis for a common stock issue or otherwise traded for current resources of
equivalent value. With the capital markets as intermediary, even risky or
contingent claims to public resources in the future can be exchanged for
real resources today.
The capital market's efficiency in intermediating claims implies that an
appropriate level of private investment can be induced through a variety of
contractual mechanism with the same cash grant-equivalent value. The
questions then remain:
1. What magnitude of financial incentive is appropriate from a
budgetary perspective; and
2. What form(s) of financial incentives will induce the private sector
to select and manage projects in ways that are consistent with
public goals?
Budgetary Evaluation
In theory, the ability of society to subsidize worthwhile projects is
unlimited. Viewed from the standpoint of social efficiency, subsidies are
simply transfers from one group of citizens (taxpayers) to others (corporate
shareholders, managers employees) that involves no resource cost to society
as a whole. Of course if distribution effects are taken into account then
transfers will be deemed to influence national welfare, but these effects
are usually separated from efficiency considerations.
Nevertheless, we maintain that even when the analysis is restricted to
consideration of efficiency, transfers do have a social resource cost.
There are several reasons for this, First, part of a subsidy may flow to
-17-
 _____
foreigners who are not included within the social cost/benefit account.
Second, if the government cannot appropriate the benefits arising from the
transfer through the fiscal system, it will have to increase tax rates
elsewhere in the economy. In so doing, it will "crowd out" certain projects
which are socially profitable but which at a higher tax rate are. no longer
attractive from a private perspective. Third, voters may impose a
constraint on total government expenditures including transfers in order to
limit the size of government and ensure careful evaluation of government
undertakings. In this case, the cost of the transfers will reflect the
marginal social opportunity cost of government expenditures.
Because the secondary effects of transfers are not neutral, it is not in
the public's interest to overcompensate private entities for undertaking
socially desired actions. Therfore, subsidies to private enterprises should
be designed to minimize the value of resources transferred relative to the
benefits gained.
In this context, the budgetary process serves three purposes. First, it
seeks to conserve public resources by requiring an evaluation of each major
project or program to determine if it deserves support, requires support,
and is not receiving excess support. Second, it provides overall
constraints on current and future spending and thus plays an important role,
along with tax policy and public debt management, in ensuring fiscal
integrity over time. These two purposes are closely intertwined, of course,
since the discipline imposed by the aggregate constraints forces tradeoffs
among projects or programs and thus motivates more careful evaluation of
individual projects. Finally, the budgetary process also seeks to ensure
-18-
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that specific interventions are appropriate in terms of the managerial
incentives they provide for project selection and management6 and that
they are efficient in terms of avoiding leakages 7 which cause the value of
what is received to be less than the value of resources foregone by the rest
of society.
From the private sector's decision rule it is evident that the grant
equivalent value of the minimum sufficient subsidy is equal to the private
value shortfall. Thus the grant-equivalent is a necessary and sufficient
measure for determining the appropriate magnitude of a subsidy. However,
through capital market intermediation, the minimum sufficient subsidy value
can be translated into an infinite variety of subsidy contracts. These
contracts may be vastly different in the time patterns and contingencies of
the implied public commitments.
5. ESTIMATING CASH GRANT-EQUIVALENTS
The cash grant-equivalent of an indirect financial subsidy is the
present value of the future transfers appropriately adjusted for risk. In
most cases, the expected future transfers are readily defined, although in
some cases they require considerable examination of the prospects of the
firm itself (e.g., Bricklin vs. G.M.). The more complex aspect of
calculating the cash grant equivalent, in general, is determining the
appropriate adjustment for risk.
6 See Baldwin, Lessard, and Mason (1981) for an extensive discussion of
the behavioral implications of various types of subsidies.
7 The most common example of leakages occurs when some portion of a
subsidy is taxed away in another jurisdiction.
-19-
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Figure 2 illustrates the methodology for evaluating grant-equivalents.
First, the future cash transfers associated with each financial incentive
must be identified. Second, given the characteristics of the cash flow in
question, an appropriate valuation method must be selected. The method will
depend on whether the future cash transfers are risky or riskless. For
riskless transfers the appropriate discount rate depends on whether future _
cash flows are fixed in money terms or indexed to the price level. For
risky transfers based on pro rata claims to a project's profits (e.g., tax
rate reduction), the discount rate depends on the systematic risk inherent
in the claim. Risky transfers of non-pro rata claims (e.g., loan
guarantees) require Contingent Claims Analysis.
A loan guarantee is a non-proportional claim on the value of the
underlying project or firm. It represents a promise to make up the
difference between the value of the firm at the end of the period and the
face value of the debt (see Figure 3). In principle, loan guarantees can be
valued by discounting the expected payouts at an appropriate risk-adjusted
discount rate. However, the appropriate risk premium is no longer
proportional to the risk premium applicable to the underlying project.
Further, the variability of the projects' value, which is a key determinant
of the expected payment, depends upon the length of time for which the
guarantee is extended. In fact, the valuation of loan guarantees and other
non-proportional claims was a problem for which there was no exact solution
for many years. However, Black and Scholes [1973] showed that
nonproportional or contingent assets could be priced exactly through
arbitrage. Specifically, they showed that a security and its underlying
project are perfectly correlated over short intervals and thus arbitrage
-20-
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conditions require that the ratio of expected excess return to the standard
deviation of return - the reward to risk ratio - be identical for the security
and the underlying project. The continuous application of this condition
results in a valuation equation for the security which, in some cases, can be
solved analytically and in all cases approximated numerically. The method is
known as Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA).
We illustrate the results of CCA with two hypothetical situations using
publicly available data for actual firms:
(1) a guarantee of a $200 million loan to International Harvester (IH)
(2) a guarentee of a $200 million loan to Dominion Textiles (DT).
This comparison is of interest since International Harvester is in financial
difficulty, and hence a likely candidate for government assistance, while
Dominion Textiles is a financially healthy company operating in a protected
sector of the economy that has received significant government assistance.
The results of Contingent Claims Analysis are consistent with the
intuitive notions that the value of a guarantee is dependent on the
probability of default. The probability of default depends on the (1) business
risk of the firm and (2) the financial risk of the firm. Business risk refers
to the volatility of returns to the firm, e.g. the returns to oil exploration
are more volatile than the returns to electric utilities. A firm with some
degree of business risk can intensify its total variability by taking on
financial risk as measured by the magnitude of its fixed financial commitments
relative to the firm's value. The probability of default increases as the
magnitude of fixed financial commitments becomes larger relative to the firm's
value.
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Table 2 sets forth the results of the Contingent Claims Analysis of
hypothetical government guarantees of $200 million loans to both
International Harvester and Dominion Textiles at the beginning of 1981.
Business risk is estimated as the variance of the annual returns to the
firms. Financial risk is measured as the magnitude of the current
liabilities, long term obligations and total annual payouts, including
interest payments, and dividends, relative to the firm's value. Since the
equity of a levered firm can be viewed as a contingent claim, the value of
the firm is estimated by inferring that value which is consistent with the
observed market value of equity. As can be seen in Table 2, International
Harvester has a higher estimated business risk than Dominion Textiles.
Furthermore, even though International Harvester is a larger, i.e., more
valuable, firm than Dominion Textiles, the magnitude of IH's financial
obligations, relative to firm value, is much larger than Dominion
Textile's. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the greater
business and financial risk of IH results in the more costly guarantee.
(
Table 2
Value of Government Loan Guarantees To
(All dollar figures in U.S. $ millions)
International Dominion
Harvester Textile
Business Risk8 .16 .04
Financial Risk
Current Liabilities $2330 $178
Long Term Obligations $1866 $220
Annual Payouts $304 $41
Market Value of Equity $247 $153
Value of Firm $2618 $584
Value of Guarantee $166 $10
8 Business risk is measured as the annual standard duration of each firm's
value estimated from stock market returns and adjusted for financial
leverage.
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Current Contingent Claims Analysis of a loan guarantee requires data
concerning the riskiness of the firm and the relative magnitude of the
firm's financial obligations. Although CCA involves relatively complex
mathematics, the conclusions of the model correspond to common sense
understanding of loan guarantees.9 The riskier the business, the higher
the probability of default and the more valuable the guarantee; and, the
greater the financial obligations of the firm relative to its worth, the
greater the probability of default and the higher the value of the guarantee.
6. ACCOUNTING FOR GUARANTEES: RECOMMENDATIONS
In previous sections we found that financial interventions are not
consistently accounted for within the Canadian budget. Specifically, loan
guarantees are not included in the current year's budget or in the
"envelope" covering projected expenditures but are charged against the
budget only when and if payment is required. Lastly, we showed that the
subsidy component of a given financial intervention could be calculated by
estimating the value of the subsidy in the private markets: this quantity
we named the grant-equivalent of the intervention.
In this section we make specific recommendations as to how indirect
financial subsidies should be accounted for in the government budgeting
process.
9 See Jones and Mason [1980] for an extended discussion of the application
of CCA to loan guarantees.
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As we noted above, the purpose of the budget is twofold. First, it
imposes a discipline which motivates careful evaluation of individual projects
and programs and of the tradeoffs among them. Second, it limits total
expenditures to a level consistent with tax and borrowing policy. In order to
provide control at the micro and macro levels as well as information for
planning at both levels, it is important that the budget process provide
consistent measures of the costs of various programs as well as their impacts
on overall expenditures in the present and future.
Our specific recommendations for extending the budget to include
guarantees are described below. First, envelopes would be given budgetary
allocations of guarantee grant-equivalents (CGE). In principle, the CGE's are.
dollar-for-dollar equivalent to cash expenditures. Realistically, the
technicalities of cash expenditure accounting and the need to control Canada's
overall exposure to contingent liabilities probably require separation of the
cash and GGE allocations within each envelope.
Second, for a large, special-purpose guarantee, such as Massey-Ferguson,
the guarantee's grant-equivalents would be calculated as part of the overall
evaluation of the proposed government intervention. Before approval, the
guarantee's grant-equivalent would be of use in negotiating the financial
contract and in estimating the effects on Canada's exposure of changes in
particular terms and covenants.
Third, assuming that the guarantee is approved by the envelope committee
and is passed by parliament, the current year's envelope would be charged the
grant-equivalent amount. Alternatively, as policy dictates, the guarantee
grant-equivalent might be spread over the multi-year policy planning horizon.
-26-
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We favor charging the envelope the cash equivalent of the guarantee rather
10
than its face value for several reasons. First, it is well-known that
within any budgetary system, economic interventions with similar real impacts
must be treated similarly: otherwise mistakes and misallocations are certain
to occur. In an advanced economy such as Canada's, it is very likely that
capital markets can transform any risky or contingent financial contract into
its cash equivalent. Therefore, a given financial intervention will have the
identical impact on real resource allocation and on the nation's fiscal
position as a (net of tax) cash subsidy equal to the cash grant equivalent of
the contracts. In this situation the only appropriate budgetary measure of a
financial intervention is its cash grant-equivalent.
A guarantee granted to a risky venture has a high private value and hence
a large impact relative to its face value on real resource allocations today.
This is reflected in the high grant-equivalent on the guarantee. Conversely,
a guarantee of a relatively safe venture (recall the GM example above) has a
low private value and a relatively small impact on resource allocations, and
this is reflected by its low grant-equivalent. Face-value budgeting for
guarantees does not distinguish between guarantees of the same face amount but
different risks. This is a serious drawback, since it causes the budgetary
process to systematically favor risky guarantees with grant-equivalents close
to their face amounts over safe guarantees with relatively low
grant-equivalents.
10 The U.S. currently records the face value of all guarantees in the
Federal Credit Budget. No attempt is made, however, to compute the
corresponding cash grant-equivalent. See United States Congress [1982].
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Grant-equivalent budgeting for guarantees is preferable to face-value
budgeting because it more correctly reflects the real impact of the
government intervention and the underlying risk of the guarantee. In Section
4 we argued that grant-equivalents of guarantees can be estimated using
contingent-claims analysis. For large, risky guarantees such as Massey
Ferguson, the incremental analysis required to estimate the guarantee's
grant-equivalent is small. Guarantees of this type should be subject to
budgetary controls based on grant-equivalent principles. Ongoing programs
which grant large numbers of small guarantees can continue to be controlled by
budgeting for average losses.
Finally, the grant-equivalent charge against the envelope would function
as an insurance premium. That is, except for a "deductible" amount, which
might remain a contingent liability of the envelope, the envelope in
subsequent years would be insulated from major shocks of defaults on large
guarantees. Instead, guarantee contingent liabilities would be managed on a
pooled basis and payments on defaults charged against appropriate central
reserve accounts.
There are a number of reasons to lump large guarantees into an aggregate
pool. First, although large guarantees to enterprises within the same economy
are not independent risks, some offsetting of risk is to be expected, thus
payments on an aggregate pool would vary less over time than payments on the
individual guarantees separately. Second, grant-equivalents can be calculated
on each transaction separately and represent the necessary payment to fund a
reserve account with zero average balance. However, because risks on
individual guarantees are not independent, some portion of the aggregate risk
-28-
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is irreducible. In order to control the irreducible risk, contingent
liabilities must be monitored on an aggregate basis. Thus, for the purpose of
assessing Canada's short- and long-term contingent liability, guarantees must
be evaluated in relation to each other. Probabilities of contingent payments
conditional on other events must be assessed in order to estimate and plan for
Canada's overall exposure.ll
Rather than actually setting up reserves, we expect that the government
would limit its total borrowing relative to some authorized maximum amount in
order to provide a borrowing cushion for meeting guarantee obligations. The
total "reserve," then, would represent the borrowing margin and would be based
on an estimate of potential aggregate guarantee expenditures over time.
11 In practice, the monitoring would take the form of periodic updating of
estimates of the sensitivity of specific guarantee obligations to a set
of common underlying factors such as overall Canadian economic
activity, unemployment, energy prices, nominal interest rates, farm
prices, etc. For an illustration of a similar portfolio analysis of
risky loans, see Feiger and Jacquillat (1982), ch. 11.
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